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On March 16, 1978, Desmond Mackin, a member of the
Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army ["I.R.A"] lay in
ambush.' Stephen Wooten, a young British soldier out on a
routine patrol of Belfast, approached.' Moments later, shots rang
out and Wooten lay wounded, yet another casualty of the troubles
in Northern Ireland.
3
Mackin was subsequently arrested but skipped bail and fled to
the United States.4 In America Mackin was apprehended by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ["I.N.S."] which sought to
extradite him to Northern Ireland to stand trial.' However,
American courts refused to order Mackin's extradition because his
attempted murder of Wooten was a political crime.6
The Mackin case illustrates a serious and growing problem in
international law: the use of the political offence exception by
terrorists to avoid extradition. This Article examines the history of
the political offence exception.7 In addition, it discusses the
problems endemic to the current system of extradition, with a
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7. See infra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
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special emphasis on terrorism.8 Finally, this Article makes several
suggestions for improving both the substance and procedure of the
political offence exception in order to restore a balance between
the protection of true political offenders and the suppression of
international crime.9
II. History of Extradition
Extradition is the process by which one jurisdiction secures the
return of a suspected or convicted criminal from another jurisdic-
tion." The principle of State sovereignty, one of the basic
premises of international law,1 encompasses the right of a State
to control all persons within its territory. 2 In keeping with this
principle,13 international law does not impose a duty of extradition
on States. Instead, this duty is established solely by treaty. 4
States are willing to cede some of their sovereignty by formulating
extradition treaties because they realize that there is more to be
gained by giving up some of their power than by allowing criminals
to go unpunished. 5
8. See infra notes 41-127 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 128-70 and accompanying text.
10. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (1991).
11. Id. at 25-26.
12. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (4th
ed. 1991).
13. That is, the state is the absolute sovereign over those within its territory.
See id.
14. See IVOR STANBROOK & CLIVE STANBROOK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF EXTRADITION XXV (1980).
While international law is often criticized as being "soft law," in fact it has a
well-defined structure. The Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies
the generally-accepted sources of international law. These include:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and,
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as a subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
Art. 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. 933 Oct. 24, 1945.
Additionally, while decisions of the ICJ have no value with respect to stare
decisis, their persuasive weight is great. HARRIS, supra note 12, at 23-24.
15. See SATYA SEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACrICE 31 (1968). In fact, extradition treaties, although limiting on a state's
sovereignty, actually exemplify that sovereignty because they must be agreed to
and cannot be imposed on a state.
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Thus, States adopt extradition treaties not out of altruism but
out of self-interest. 6 When States execute an extradition treaty,
however, the "fundamental principle of the law of treaties"'7
mandates that it is "binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."'"
Extradition was originally accomplished via informal surrender
or return, and was viewed as an act of courtesy from one sovereign
to another. 9 For this reason, extradition was initially sought only
to secure the return of persons who had committed crimes against
the sovereign.2' As a result, extradition at its nascence was not
contemplated for common criminals because they were "not
considered... a public danger."'"
However, the Industrial Revolution led to the large-scale
migration of immigrants and naturally resulted in the international
movement of criminals. 22  Consequently, an increased need to
extradite individuals arose for so-called "common" crimes such as
murder, rape, and theft.23  A desire to memorialize and codify
extradition law in treaties accompanied this need.24
16. See id. at 15; CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 5 (1980). This rationale is even more compelling
today, with the increasingly transnational character of criminality. "As time
passes, whether acknowledged or not, the real capacity of the state to provide the
requisite domestic stability is diminishing .... Richard Falk, Toward Obsoles-
cence: Sovereignty in the Era of Globalization, 17 HARV. INT'L REV. 35 (1995).
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, reprinted in HARRIS,
supra note 12, at 762.
18. See Art. 26, Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, May 22, 1969,
8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Even states which are not a party
to this Convention are bound by this principle as it is a binding norm of customary
international law. See HARRIS, supra note 12, at 762 (discussing the principle of
pacta sunt servanta). Thus, States are bound to interpret and apply treaty
provisions in good faith. However, because at least two theories exist to justify
refusing to extradite terrorists, this may not appear to be as high a duty. See infra
notes 105-27 and accompanying text.
19. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 4 (1974).
20. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 16, at 5.
21. Id.
22. See BEDI, supra note 15, at 16-17.
23. Id. at 16. See also Abraham Abramovsky, The Political Offence Exception
and the Extradition Process: The Enhancement of the Role of the U.S. Judiciary,
13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989).
24. See Abramovsky, supra note 23.
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III. The Political Offence Exception
Treaties do not impose an unqualified duty to extradite
individuals. Instead, they are subject to the political offence
exception25 which mandates that the State to which the individual
flees must not allow extradition for crimes which are of a political
character.26
The political offence exception was created to protect dissi-
dents from judicial retribution for their political activities. 27 While
extradition was originally sought for those who had offended the
sovereign by committing political crimes, the advent of liberal
democracies brought about a revolution of ideas which resulted in
increased sympathy for political offenders."
For instance, the French government was hesitant about
extraditing political offenders as early as 1829.29 But it codified,
for the first time, the political offence exception in the Belgian
Extradition Act of October 1, 1833.30 The exception soon found
its way into numerous extradition treaties, including the U.S. -
Belgian Extradition Treaty of 1843. 11
The exception has since become universally accepted. As the
late British Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed, "in the
legislation of modern states there are few principles so universally
adopted as that of non-extradition of political offenders.
' 32
25. This exception is technically a reservation. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT,
supra note 16, at 45. In extradition proceedings in which the political offence
exception is invoked, the burden is on the detainee to present evidence sufficient
to bring herself within the ambit of its protection. See, e.g., McGlinchey v. Wren
[1989] 79 I.L.R. 49, 53.
26. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Bolivia, June 27, 1995, U.S.-Bol., U.S.T.
1995 WL 646382. While the phrasing is somewhat nebulous, the only recorded
attempt to actually define "political offence" in extradition law was in the German
Extradition Law of 1929, which is generally regarded as a miserable failure. See
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offences: A Knotty Problem of
Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1229-30 (1962) [hereinafter Garcia-Mora,
A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law].
27. See VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 16, at 11-12; Extradition Act of
1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
49 (1981), cited in Abramovsky, supra note 23, at 87.
28. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 11.
29. See id. at 11-12.
30. Bull. Off. LXVII, No. 1195 and Pasinomie 1833, Vol. III, p. 239 [the
Belgian Extradition Act of Oct. 1, 1833], cited in VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 16, at 12 & n.60.
31. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 13.
32. Hersch Lauterpacht, Laws of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,
1944 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 88.
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The political offence exception developed out of an "almost
naive" identification of liberal democrats with political offenders.33
After all, it was not so long ago that they too had revolted against
autocratic governments. They saw an idealized version of them-
selves in these dissidents, never considering that someday they too
would face those same guns.
34
The 1890's saw a rise in the activities of anarchists, who sought
to overthrow all forms of government. Their activities posed
special problems for the political offence exception.35  The
problem was solved by .adopting a restrictive definition of "politi-
cal.",3 6 This new definition carved out several "exceptions to the
exception," with the most notable being the attentat clause which
stated that attempts on the life of the head of state was not
sufficiently political so as to refuse extradition.37 The political
offence exception was also restricted by the qualified interpreta-
tions given by municipal law.38 These restrictions, however, have
failed to stop the exception's application to the modern equivalent
of anarchists:, terrorists.
IV. Defining Political
In the struggle to ascertain which offences merit protection,
there is a strict division between "pure" and "relative" political
offences.39 Furthermore, within the relative political offence
category there are three distinct approaches which are used to
determine which offences are not subject to extradition.'
A. "Pure" Political Offences
Pure political offences are actions which are directed solely at
the State and do not affect civilians. In addition, they are not
33. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 14.
34. Id. Ironically, the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, a
State which owed its birth directly to political revolution, reserved its highest
penalty for political offenders. HAROLD J. BERMAN & JAMES W. SPINDLER,
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 27 (2d ed. 1972).
Under the 1926 Criminal Code, serious political crimes merited the death penalty;
by contrast, intentional homicide merited only ten years imprisonment. Id.
35. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 14.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 15 & n.75.
38. See infra notes 54-104 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 41-104 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
342 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2
accompanied by the commission of a common crime.41 These
include such crimes as treason, sedition, conspiracy-to overthrow
the government, and espionage.42
There seems to be unanimity in the international community
that these pure political crimes clearly qualify for the political
offence exception.43 States have little trouble accepting the
application of the political offence exception to these crimes for
several reasons. First, the nature of these crimes is such that they
lack the elements of common crimes.' For instance, they do not
offend the common sense of justice in the same way as rape or
murder.45 Second, these pure political crimes often fail to satisfy
the requirement of dual criminality in which extradition may be
refused for any offence which does not also constitute a crime in
the requested state.46 Third, on a philosophical plane, since these
acts are directed against the state they epitomize the types of acts
which the political offence exception was designed to protect.47
B. "Relative" Political Offences
Despite the acceptance of pure political offences, there is an
inconsistent application of the political offence exception to delits
complexes, or "relative" political offenses.48 These are crimes
which have a hybrid nature, that is, they involve either a combina-
tion of a common crime with a pure political offence,49 or more
41. See Garcia-Mora, A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, supra note 26, at
1237.
42. See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political
Offences Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. Prr. L. REV. 65 (1964) [hereinafter
Garcia-Mora, Sedition]. Indeed, there is authority in state practice that espionage
is not always an international delict, but may actually be the norm. See Id. at 79-
80.
43. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949) (allowing a prosecution for treason, but noting that
extradition could have been refused); Ex parte Kolczynski, 1 Q.B. 540 (1954)
(refusing to extradite mutineers from a Polish vessel); Alfred E. Novotne, Random
Bombing of Public Places: Extradition and Punishment of Indiscriminate Violence
Against Innocent Parties, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 219, 230 (1988).
44. But see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982) (murder); Canadian Criminal Code,
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 222(1) (1985) (Can) (murder).
45. See generally Novotne, supra note 43, at 230.
46. BEDI, supra note 15, at 69-77. Prosecution based on political speech or
dissidence usually fails this requirement, especially if the requested state is a
liberal democracy. See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, Sedition, supra note 42, at 86-88.
47. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 49-104 and accompanying text.
49. For example, espionage coupled with assault. See Regina v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison ex parte Rebott, Ls GAz. 43 (1978), cited in STANBROOK &
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often, a common crime which is perpetrated pursuant to a political
agenda." These crimes are problematic because they force
governments to wrestle with the fundamental question of whether
a criminal should be given de facto immunity from prosecution
simply because of the reason for his criminality and thus, are quite
problematic. Unfortunately, no clear answer has emerged. Instead,
three discrete approaches have arisen: the "political incidence"
test,5 the "predominant purpose" test,52 and the "mixed" Conti-
nental approach. 3
1. The Anglo-American "Political Incidence"
Approach.-Great Britain and the United States require that a
crime, in order to be classified as political, must have been
"incidental to and form[ed] part of political disturbances. 5 4 The
seminal case which established this standard was In re Castioni, in
which Switzerland sought the extradition of Angelo Castioni from
England for the crime of murder.55 Castioni was a citizen of the
Canton of Ticino in Switzerland.56 After much unrest resulting
from civilian dissatisfaction with the local authorities, Castioni,
along with a mob of fellow citizens, stormed the municipal
palace. As they broke in, Castioni shot and killed Luigi Rossi,
STANBROOK, supra note 14, at 111.
50. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text and infra notes 51-104 and
accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
53. Under relevant rules of treaty interpretation, one must first look to the
"plain meaning" of the words of a treaty in order to effectuate the parties' intent.
Art. 31, Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, supra note 18. Since the
wording of the political offence exception is fairly ambiguous, "recourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation," including judicial decisions and the
writings of publicists, to aid in the arena of the political offence exception.
Municipal law has attained primacy in interpreting questions of international law.
54. In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149, 166 (1891). This test has gained acceptance in
numerous other nations. See, e.g., In re Pavelic and Kwaternik, 7 ANN. DIG. 372
(Corte d'appelo, Turin 1933-34) (refusing extradition for two accused of complicity
in the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia); In re Peyre, 22 I.L.R. 525
(Camara Nacional Especial 1955) (granting extradition of Peyre, who was accused
of giving bribes to support Ho Chi Minh's Indo-China policy, stating that Peyre
was "not ... motivated by any consideration other than his own profit."); In re De
Bernonville, 22 I.L.R. 527-28 (R.S.T., Brazil 1955) (refusing extradition of a man
accused of treason by France); In re Campora, 24 I.L.R. 518 (Supreme Court
Chile, 1957) (refusing extradition of former officials in the government of
Argentine President Juan Peron).
55. In re Castioni, supra note 54, at 150.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 150-51.
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a State Councillor.58 In the aftermath, Castioni fled to England
and subsequently, Switzerland sought his extradition.59
Although the local magistrate felt that extradition was justified,
the Queen's Bench reversed his decision stating that it was "clear
that the offence with which the prisoner-is charged is an offence of
a political character . . ."' Thus, the offence did not justify
extradition under the political offence exception of the applicable
extradition treaty.61  In struggling to propagate a workable
standard, the Court stated that "fugitive criminals are not to be
surrendered for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances., 62 While admitting
that this formulation was somewhat vague, Justice Hawkins wrote
that it was "the most perfect to be found or capable of being given
"163
This standard was further refined in the case of In re
Meunier.' In Meunier, the French government demanded the
extradition of an anarchist accused of detonating a bomb which
killed two people.65 The Queen's Bench demanded extradition
but imposed a further "party affiliation" requirement on the
Castioni test. It stated that "there must be two or more parties in
the state, each seeking to impose the Government of their own
choice on the other., 66 Since anarchists did not have such a party
and advocated the absence of government, the court ruled that
extradition was proper.67
While embracing the Castioni test,68 United States courts have
tended to apply the factors in a "mechanical" fashion69 which has
led to blatant inequities. For instance, in Artukovic v. Boyle,
58. Id.
59. Id. at 149.
60. Id. at 152.
61. In re Castioni, supra note 54, at 152.
62. Id. at 166.
63. Id.
64. 2 Q.B. 415 (1894).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 419.
67. Id. See also Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, 2 All E.R. 204
(H.L. 1973) (applying Meunier standard to attempted murderer of Chiang Kai-
Shek's son).
68. See In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (adopting the reasoning of
Castioni); Steven J. Dunn, Recent Decisions, The Political Offence Exception to
Extradition: A 19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1011 (1984).
69. James L. Taulbee, Political Crimes, Human Rights, and Contemporary
International Practice, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 43, 63 (1990).
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extradition of a former pro-Nazi Croatian government official was
denied despite evidence of his complicity in the execution of
200,000 Serb prisoners.7 ° In applying the Castioni factors, the
court found that the offences were sufficiently political.71 While
this situation was subsequently rectified by amending United States
immigration laws to allow Artukovic's deportation, the reasoning
of the court remains valid.
7 2
In the case of terrorism, American courts have often refused
to extradite terrorists, most notably members of the IRA.73 In In
re Doherty, for example, the United Kingdom sought extradition of
Joseph Doherty, a member of the IRA who had been convicted in
absentia for the 1981 murder of a British Army Captain. 74 As in
Mackin, this murder occurred as the result of an ambush of a
routine patrol.75
Despite Doherty's admitted involvement in the IRA and his
adjudicated involvement in the murder, the District Court for the
Southern District of New.York refused to order extradition because
"the realities of the modern world" and the circumstances sur-
rounding the IRA's struggle were sufficient to characterize the
actions of IRA members as political crimes.76 Thus, American
courts effectively provided a safe haven for some terrorists.77
70. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd sub nom.,
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded per
curiam, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), surrender denied on remand sub nom., United States
v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
71. 247 F.2d at 198.
72. See In re Artukovic, Case No. CV 84-8743-R (B), CV 85-3611-R (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 6, 1986), cited in Taulbee, supra note 69, at 64. See also Sarah L. Nagy,
Comment, Political Offence Exceptions to United States Extradition Policy: Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare (Either Extradite or Prosecute), 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 109, 136 (1991). It is important to note that Artukovic's eventual return was
through the "back door," as he was deported, not extradited. See Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) stating that the power to exclude aliens is
"inherent in sovereignty" (quoting, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
737-38 (1893)(Justice Brewer, dissenting)).
73. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); McMullen v. I.N.S.,
788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing extradition for an accused bomber of a
British Army installation).
74. 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Extradition Treaty, June
8, 1972, U.S.-U.K. 28 U.S.T. 227, 1049 U.N.T.S. 167.
75. 599 F. Supp. at 272.
76. Id. at 274-76.
77. This problem was addressed subsequently by establishing a Supplemental
Treaty which excludes terrorism from the political offence exception. See
Supplementary Treaty Concerning The Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1985, U.S.-U.K.-N. Ir., 24 I.L.M.
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2. The Swiss "Predominant Motive" Approach.-Swiss courts
have rejected the English political incidence test, preferring a more
rigorous examination of the offender's motivation and circumstan-
ces.78  They have adopted what is by far the most restrictive
approach: the "predominant motive" or "proportionality" test.79
Under this test, the predominant motive of the offender determines
if the offence is of an apolitical character.8" Nevertheless, Swiss
courts have adopted a rather crabbed view of "predominant
motive" by erecting stringent requirements for the political offence
exception's application. Thus, despite the test's name, political
motivation alone is not sufficient.8'
The Swiss standard was set forth in 1908 in the Wassilieff Case,
in which Russia sought the extradition of Victor Wassilieff for
murdering a local police chief.' Wassilieff claimed that the killing
was politically motivated because it had been carried out at the
behest of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist Party, which was
attempting to overthrow the Tsar.83 In granting extradition, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal held that three criteria must be present to
withhold extradition: first, the act must have been committed
1105 (entered into force, Dec. 23, 1986).
78. See Bedi, supra note 15, at 182-83.
79. Perhaps not coincidentally, it was Switzerland's extradition request that
was spumed in In re Castioni. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
80. Art. 10, Swiss Extradition Act, cited in VAN DEN WLJNGAERT, supra note
16, at 126. See also Article 67 of the Swiss Federal Constitution, which provides
that extradition from one Canton to another "may not be made compulsory for
political... offences." FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND (Christopher
Hughes, trans., 1970).
81. This standard has also been adopted by Austria, see EDITH PALMER, THE
AUSTRIAN LAW OF EXTRADITION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS (1983); Italy, see also Public Prosecutor v. Zind, 40 I.L.R. 214 (Cass.
1961) (refusing extradition of a man convicted in Germany of espousing pro-Nazi
sentiments); see In re Bressano, 40 I.L.R. 219 (Camara Federal de la Capital
Argentina 1965) (granting extradition for a bank robber as the "common crime
element dominated over the political character of the offence charged"); see In re
De Bernonville, 22 I.L.R. 527 (R.S.T., Brazil 1955); see In re Garcia Zepeda, 22
I.L.R. 528 (Supreme Court Chile 1955) (refusing extradition for the accused
murderer of a Guatemalan Army Captain during an uprising); see In re Fabijan 7
ANN. DIG. 360 (F.R.G. 1933) (allowing extradition because there was no
"concrete" political act).
82. No official report exists. But see, Bradley Larschan, Extradition, The
Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: An Overview of the Three Principal
Theories of Law, 4 B.U. INT'L. J. 231, 272 (1986) for a report of the case.
83. See id.
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appurtenant to a purely political offence;' 4 second, the act must
constitute a truly efficient means to reach the purpose;85 and third,
the elements of common criminality must be proportional to the
political goal.86 This proportionality requirement was subsequent-
ly further refined requiring that the political character of the crime
must "outweigh its characteristics as a common crime."87
Thus, under the Swiss approach, one must show more than a
mere connection to a political party or that the crime was related
to a political agenda. In practice, the added requirement of
proportionality has come to mean that the crime must have been
"necessary."88
Swiss courts have almost universally refused to sanction the
taking of human lives unless it is the ultimo ratio, or last resort, for
achieving a political agenda.89 Additionally, they have adopted an
almost per se rule as to terrorism, holding that terrorist acts cannot
be proportional to the dissidents' goal because such acts are
"repugnant to any civilized conscience."'  Despite this declared
aversion to terrorism, Swiss courts have, on occasion, refused
extradition for members of terrorist groups. In the Watin case, the
Tribune Federale applied the ultimo ratio concept to justify its
refusal to extradite a member of the Algerian separatist group
Organization Arm~e Secrete ["OAS"].91 Watin had attempted to
assassinate Prime Minister De Gaulle in order to gain Algeria's
independence from France.92 While agreeing that action through
the ballot box was preferable, the Swiss court stated that, when
viewed from Watin's standpoint, "the assassination ... seem[ed] to
84. Id. For an examination of pure political offences, see supra, notes 41-47
and accompanying text.
85. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 129 n.684.
86. See id. at 126.
87. See Garcia-Mora, A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, supra note 26, at
1254-55.
88. See Novotne, supra note 43, at 237.
89. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 16, at 129. There is conflicting
authority in Swiss case law as to whether a subjective or objective test is to be
used. Compare Ktir v. Minist~re public f~ddral, BGE 87 I 134, 142 (1961)
(granting extradition for an Algerian nationalist accused of murdering a
compatriot, stating that, objectively viewed, the killing was not a political crime,
but merely "un acte de vengeance et de terreur" [an act of vengeance and of
terror]) with Watin v. Minist~re public f~dral, BGE 90 I 298 (1964) (refusing
extradition using a subjective standard).
90. Della Savia v. Ministero pubblico della Confederazione, BGE 95 1462, 470
(1969) (calling the actions "ripugnano ad ogni coscienza civile").
91. 90 A.T.F. I 300-01.
92. Id. at 298.
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be the last [viable] option."93  Therefore, extradition was re-
fused.94
3. The "Mixed" Continental Approach. -Current French
practice exemplifies the mixed approach. While French courts long
applied a motivation test95 under which extradition was denied as
long as the act had a political motive,96 in the past two decades
France has moved to a mixed approach in which the perpetrator's
motive is weighed against the seriousness of the crime commit-
ted.97 More serious crimes militate toward ordering extradition.98
In the Croissant case, the Court of Appeals of Paris applied
this approach in ordering the extradition of an accomplice of the
Baader-Meinhoff group despite the admitted political motivation of
the group.99 Noting that their actions were "characterized by...
contempt towards the life of [innocent] victims ... and towards the
property of other persons," the Court held that the group's
motivation "could not ... constitute an obstacle to the extradi-
tion.,,100
Despite this holding, French practice has not been uniform on
the subject of terrorism. For example, until 1984, France routinely
refused to extradite members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ["ETA"],
93. Id. at 301 ("[1]'dssassinat ... apparaltre comme la derniere resource ...
pratiquement.").
94. Id. See also Ktir, B.G.E. 87 1 134, 137 (1961).
95. At one time, French courts applied an objective test, but abandoned it in
favor of a subjective one. Compare In re Gatti and Da Palma Inacio, cited in VAN
DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 121-23.
96. See, e.g., Da Palima Inacio, (refusing extradition for politically-motivated
bank robbery), cited in VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 122-23 n.659.
The apex of this approach is found in the Hennin case, in which extradition was
refused for a separatist who had set off a series of bombs near Bern, Switzerland.
See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 123. The Court of Appeal of Paris
refused extradition for this terrorist because he had acted out of political motives.
Id. This has been criticized as "subjectivisme exagere" (exaggerated subjectivism).
Id.
97. See generally VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 123-26.
98. Id.
99. Cited in VAN DEN W[JNGAERT, supra note 16, at 124 n.664. See also The
Concept of the Urban Guerilla, in THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL
ANTHOLOGY 176-79 (Walter Laqueur & Yonah Alexander, eds., 1987) (detailing
the group's motivation).
100. Croissant, cited in VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 124 n.664.
Belgian courts have taken this "seriousness" element a step further in the
terrorism milieu, stating categorically that actions which endanger innocent persons
who are not involved in the political conflict do not qualify as political crimes.
Abarca, (involving a failed attempt to bomb an airplane in protest of Spain's
Franco regime), cited in VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 16, at 125 n.666.
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the notorious Basque separatist group responsible for numerous
murders and car bombings in Spain. 1  Additionally, in 1977,
France arrested Abu Daoud, who was suspected of involvement in
the 1972 "Black September's" massacre of Israeli athletes by the
Group Black September at the Munich Olympics."° Despite
extradition demands from both West Germany and Israel, French
courts ordered Daoud's release. 0 3
V. Justifications in International Law
A. Terrorism and Self-Determination
As previously asserted, terrorists have often benefitted
incidentally from the application of the political offence exception.
A more insidious problem, however, would arise if a State were to
specifically adopt or apply a particular approach in order to justify
a refusal to extradite any individual. Would this be valid under
international law?
While the United Nations has condemned all acts of terrorism
"wherever and whenever committed,"'" it has, arguably, sanc-
tioned terrorism when it is done for the pursuit of self-determina-
tion. The principle of self-determination mandates that "[a]ll
peoples have the right to ... freely determine their political status.
... ,,105 This principle is enumerated as one of the purposes of
the United Nations1" and has been reiterated in numerous
international agreements, including the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights"°7 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."°
The right to self-determination, which has principally been
applied in the arena of decolonization,"°9 has been deemed a
101. See Taulbee, supra note 69, at 56.
102. See Id. at 57.
103. Id.
104. G.A. Res. 40/61, Jan. 14, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 239.
105. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 343-44 (Burns H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
106. U.N. Charter, art. 1(3).
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 368.
108. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 360.
109. See Jill Watson, Self-Determination of Peoples and Politics, 86 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L. PROC. 369, 374-76 (1992) (reporting remarks of Dr. Bieber).
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"fundamental human right."'11 As such, States have a duty under
the United Nations Charter to actively promote the exercise of this
right."' This duty also exists under both of the previously cited
Covenants.1 2 Some commentators believe that there is a right, if
not a political duty, for States to render assistance in such strug-
gles.'
3
This duty to promote self-determination must be viewed in
conjunction with the international community's recognition that
coercive force, which is generally prohibited,"4 is justified when
used to promote the right to self-determination." 5 For example,
the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, which outlines the
levels of coercion which the General Assembly deems violative of
Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the Charter, specifically exempts force
when used to further self-determination." 6 Additionally, the 1979
Taking of Hostages Convention exempts self-determination-inspired
110. East Timor Case (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 13 (June 30).
111. U.N. Charter, arts. 55 & 56.
112. U.N. Charter, art. 1(3).
113. W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-
Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 35-41 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer, eds). This is probably a recognition that minorities which possess this
right can be prevented from exercising it by virtue of the disparity of power
between themselves and their government. The ability to seek and receive
assistance levels the playing field somewhat. This recalls the words of the
Algerian novelist Camus, who wrote that in a struggle between man and an
oppressive regime, "[c]rushed between human evil and destiny, between terror and
the arbitrary, all that remains to him is his power to rebel . . . ." Albert Camus,
Beyond Nihilism, in THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT 304 (A. Bower
Trans. 1956).
114. For example, the General Assembly has declared: Every State has the duty
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commissions of such acts, when
the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or
use of force.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24,
1970, 9 I.L.M. 1292. See also U.N. Charter, arts. 2(3) & (4).
115. See Reisman, supra note 113. For an opposing view, see OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 119-120 (1995)
(stating that "no such exception ... has been accepted by the community of
States").
116. In the arena of self-determination, people have the right to "struggle to
that end and to seek and receive support ...." Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression, Apr. 12, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 710, 714.
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terrorism from its scope." 7 This is especially important because
most terrorist organizations have a philosophical grounding in self-
determination.'18
Despite an apparent "license," few States have chosen to
actively support terrorism; those that have, such as the Libyan
Jamahiriya and Sudan, have met with international censure.
19
Nevertheless, these repeated textual references provide a strong
argument that a State may seek refuge in this respect and "promote
language of the Charter to justify an otherwise delictual refusal to
extradite a terrorist."'12
B. Intertemporal Law
As noted above, the political offence exception has at times
been interpreted and applied in such a way that terrorists would
gain protection. 2' While these former interpretations have now
been eschewed, they still pose potential problems.
In interpreting treaties, the International Court of Justice
["I.C.J."] long adhered to the principle of tempus regit factum.
122
In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, for example, the Court
stated that "[t]he evolution of law ... cannot change the meaning
117. International Taking of Hostages Convention, Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.
118. For example, the IRA's aim is the liberation of Northern Ireland from
British rule. See generally Freedom Struggle by the Provisional IRA, in THE
TERRORISM READER 132 (Walter Laqueur & Yonah Alexander, eds. 1987). The
PLO was founded to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian homeland which
arose from the (arguably) illegal use of force to acquire territory subsequent to the
end of the British mandate and the Arab-Israeli War. See id. at 145.
119. See generally Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility
For Injuries To Aliens Occasioned By Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217
(1977). See also Id. at n.367 (expressing an expansive view of "political" taken by
Central American nations).
120. Another weakness is that even if extradition is improperly refused,
international practice is not dispositive of a proper remedy. While the state that
requests extradition would obviously prefer the return of the offender, courts have
not given primacy to this form of quasi-restitutio in integrum. In the Casablanca
case, for example, French Army deserters sought asylum in the German embassy
in Casablanca. The French violated the diplomatic protection of the embassy and
seized the deserters. See Art. 22, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (stating that "[t]he premises of the
mission shall be inviolable"). In Germany's subsequent suit against France, the
Court declined to order the return of the soldiers to Germany, the asylum State,
preferring instead to merely exact a formal apology from the French Republic.
121. See, e.g., supra notes 54-77 (noting American refusal to extradite IRA
members) and notes 96-104 (addressing French practice pre-1976).
122. The time rules the facts. This is also known as the doctrine of contempor-
aneity; that is, a contemporaneous interpretation is preferred.
352 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2
of a declaration; it cannot make the declarant say what he did not
wish to say or even what he could not have wished to say."'"
Under this theory, known as intertemporal law, the terms of
a treaty must be interpreted in light of their meaning at the time
the treaty was established.124 Thus, if a State established an
extradition treaty at a time when one of the aforementioned
interpretations was extant, there is international authority that the
State would be justified in continuing to apply that approach.
While it is true that the problem of terrorism has grown
enormously in the past twenty years, there is support in State
practice vis-a-vis terrorism for the primacy of this doctrine. When
the United States and the United Kingdom were thwarted by the
successful invocation of the political offence exception by members
of the IRA, they concluded a Supplemental Treaty that specifically
excluded acts of terrorism from the exception's ambit."z  This
treaty was a tacit recognition that the previous interpretation of the
political offence exception was in conformity with the requirements
of international law at the time the former treaty was entered into.
In order to change the result, the treaty had to be changed.
Both this doctrine and the legitimacy given to self-determina-
tion struggles provide the basis for States which have refused the
extradition of terrorists to validly claim that they have fulfilled their
"good faith" duties in their performance of the extradition treaty.
VI. Proposals For Change
The application of the political offence exception has suffered
from the vagaries of the shifting political winds of the moment.
Although revered in theory as a bulwark of liberalism, it has too
often been subordinated to the perceived need to seek political
advantage by acceding to an extradition request. 2 6
As at least one commentator has argued, this recasting of what
is a fundamentally legal question in political terms is tantamount to
123. 1978 I.C.J. 3, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Dec. 19) (Greece v.
Turk.) (interpreting a Greek declaration as to jurisdiction).
124. See Western Sahara Case 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (Advisory opinion)
(concerning Morocco's claim to certain territory in Western Sahara).
125. See supra note 77.
126. This is hardly surprising since extradition was originally agreed to as a
means of currying favor with another sovereign. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 16, at 5. If the country has adopted an approach that would merit the
exception's application, then the Foreign Ministry may simply seek deportation.
This would not merit the same protections afforded in an extradition hearing.
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a violation of human rights.127 Additionally, in its current incar-
nations, the political offence exception is too often open to abuse.
by terrorists. Given these endemic problems, change is clearly in
order.
A. Clearly-Accepted Definition of "Political"
While abolition of the political offence exception would be the
easiest way to assure uniform treatment, this seems to be a rather
fantastic suggestion. While states differ on the approach to take,
and while "no contemporary municipal legal system recognizes
political motivation as a bar to prosecution,"'" no civilized nation
has seriously questioned the continuing validity of the exception
itself. 29
Among the three approaches, the English system is somewhat
artificial, especially the "party" requirement imposed by
Meunier.'30  Instead, the French system's balancing approach
would best effectuate the original aim of the political offence
exception while ensuring that true criminals are punished.'
1. Adoption of Multilateral Vice Bilateral Treaties.-Another
source of disunity is the plethora of bilateral extradition trea-
ties.132  While there have been several attempts to regulate
certain crimes, 33 these attempts address the symptom and not the
127. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 64-66.
128. Taulbee, supra note 69, at 49.
129. While fantastic, it is not wholly without merit. Since a crime is an offence
against both the state and one's fellow citizens, should it be excused merely
because of the perpetrator's motivation? In the words of Viscount Radcliffe to the
House of Lords:
There may, for instance, be all sorts of contending political
organizations or forces in a country and members of them may
commit all sorts of infractions of the criminal law in the belief
that by so doing they will further their political ends: but if the
central government stands apart and is concerned only to
enforce the criminal law that has been violated by these
contestants, I see no reason why fugitives should be protected
-by this country from its jurisdiction on the ground that they are
political offenders.
Schtraks v. Israel, 33 I.L.R. 332 (H.L. 1967).
130. See supra, notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
131. See supra, notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra note 14, at App. A (listing
numerous extradition treaties); 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988) (listing nations with which
the United States has extradition treaties).
133. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the Prevention
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disease. Effecting multilateral extradition treaties, perhaps under
the auspices of the United Nations, would be a more effective and
lasting approach. Indeed, the creation of a single treaty subscribed
to by all nations would be the optimal solution.1 4 It would truly
transnationalize extradition.
There seem to be few obstacles to such a program. For
example, a consensus exists on crimes generally covered by
extradition treaties. Therefore, it is likely that nations could agree
on the crimes to be covered in a multilateral treaty. This agree-
ment would not require states to cede any more of their sovereign-
ty than in the current scheme.
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
provides ample precedent for such an agreement. 35 The Conven-
tion requires that a State, when examining an extradition request,
weigh the following factors against the perpetrator: (1) that the
action created a "collective danger" to life, liberty, or physical
integrity; (2) that the act affected persons foreign to the motives;
or (3) that cruel or vicious means were used.136
This Convention likewise sets forth numerous acts of terrorism
which are excluded from the application of the political offence
exception, including hijacking, kidnapping, or offences involving the
use of explosives.137 This agreement has proven very successful
and should set the standard for similar agreements on a larger
scale.
2. The Creation of an International Criminal Court.-Several
commentators have suggested creating an international court with
jurisdiction over criminal matters.138 This idea has been precipita-
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
134. At least, all civilized nations. It is a lamentable reality of international
relations that there will likely always be some renegade states which will either
refuse to join such conventions or, as a result of past misconduct, not be allowed
to participate.
135. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1976, 15 I.L.M.
1272 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1978).
136. European Convention, supra note 135, Art. 13(1).
137. See id. arts. l(a) - (f).
138. See William N. Gianaris, The New World Order And The Need For An
International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (1992); John B.
Anderson, An International Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea, 15 NOVA L. REV.
433 (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on
International Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression of
International and Transnational Criminality, 15 NOVA L. REV. 353, 357 (1991); M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
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ted by several problems, including the rise in terrorism and the
abuse of extradition treaties by accused criminals with "connec-
tions.
139
The idea for such a court is not altogether new. In 1926, the
International Association of Penal Law proposed that criminal
jurisdiction should be given to the Permanent Court of Internation-
al Justice of the League of Nations.1" Consequently, in 1937 the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and
for the Creation of an International Criminal Court was promulga-
ted.
141
Despite the lack of momentum to establish such a court, in the
post-World War II era the United Nations has addressed the
subject on several occasions. In 1951, the Special Committee of the
General Assembly promulgated the Draft Statute for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court14 2 which was largely based on the 1926
International Association of Penal Law recommendations. 43
States believed that this 1951 Statute infringed too greatly on their
sovereignty.1" Thus, a Revised Draft Statute was created in 1953
which called for a court "to try natural persons accused of crimes
generally recognized under international law," '45 but only when
the States had conferred jurisdiction over the crimes involved.
1 6
These Drafts, however, have never been passed.
14 7
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 151 (1992).
139. In addition to bribes, terrorist tactics are now being used by "narco-
terrorists" to ensure that local governments will refuse to extradite them. See
Faiza Patel, Crime Without Frontiers: A Proposal for an International Narcotics
Court, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 713 (1990); Bruce Zagaris, Protecting the
Rule of Law from Assault in the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism, 15
NOVA L. REV. 703, 704 (1991).
140. See Robert A. Friedlander, The Foundations of International Law: A
Present-Day Inquiry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L, 13, 18-19 (1983).
141. Id. at 19. No state signed the Convention on the International Criminal
Court. Id.
142. Draft Statute for An International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 489, U.N.
GAOR, 7th Sess., Annex 1, Supp. No. 11, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
143. See Gianaris, supra note 138, at 93 n.20.
144. See id. at 93-94 n.21.
145. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, art. 1, G.A. Res.
489, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 12, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
146. Id. at art. 29.
147. See Gianaris, supra note 138, at 95. Despite the United States' failure to
sign either Convention, the House of Representatives has, paradoxically, called for
"the establishment of an International Criminal Court to... deal[] ... with...
acts of terrorism, drug trafficking, genocide and torture.... H.R.J. Res. 66, 101st
Cong. § 2 (1989).
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There are numerous benefits to establishing an International
Court. First, such a body would be able to apply a single, uniform
body of law, thus alleviating choice of law problems."4 Second,
states would have no cause to doubt the legitimacy of the Court's
decisions, doubts that have in the past led to illegal acts to capture
criminals and bring them before the accusing state's courts.
149
Third, an International Court would solve choice of forum
problems. 5° Last, it could be used by States that do not have an
extradition treaty extant between them."
The leading proposal for a Court is that of Professor Bassiouni
who envisions a court with the power to investigate, issue arrest
warrants and subpoenas and try criminals for numerous crimes.'
5 2
Unfortunately, given that nations have been unwilling to cede such
power to a supranational body in the past, it is unlikely that they
will do so in the near future. 53
3. International Court to Determine Political Status. -The loss
of state sovereignty that would result from the creation of an
International Criminal Court probably dooms it to a life only in law
review articles. An International Court or Commission, created for
the sole purpose of ruling on extradition demands in which the
148. See Gianaris, supra note 138, at 105-08.
149. See Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal
Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867
(1992); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (allowing a
person who was forcibly abducted to be tried in American courts).
150. See Gianaris, supra note 138, at 110; Patel, supra note 139, at 733.
151. See Gianaris, supra note 138, at 110.
152. BASSIOUNI, supra note 138, at 226-42. Professor Bassiouni's proposal is
very similar to one which is currently being proposed by the International Law
Commission. Compare M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code
and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987) with Draft Articles
on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Sept.
11, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1584 [hereinafter Draft Code]. However, even ILC reports
admit that support from the international community is far from unanimous.
While the idea of an ICC has garnered support, a "substantial" number of states
have reserved opinion until the drafts are complete and a few have repudiated the
idea in toto. See Rose Marie Karadsheh, Creating an International Criminal Court:
Confronting the Conflicting Criminal Procedures of Iran and the United States, 14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 243, 252-63 (1996).
153. As one author noted, "[r]equiring the consent of the nation harboring the
accused would present some of the problems that weaken extradition." Gianaris,
supra note 139, at 116. Without this consent, some form of coercion (force or
economic sanctions) would have to be used. See id. at 117. This would clearly
violate the Charter of the United Nations, which forbids "the use or threat of
force" in international relations. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). It seems counterproduc-
tive to break the law in order to enforce it.
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political offence exception has been raised, would be a more
measured approach for the following reasons.'-'
In the course of normal extradition proceedings municipal legal
systems have competently adjudicated issues such as dual crimina-
lity and specialty. However, the political offence exception is a
thorny issue. Given the disparate results in the application of the
three approaches, the advantage of a neutral arbiter applying a
single, uniform standard, can hardly be overemphasized. Aside
from obviating the problems caused by the application of divergent
views of the political offence, removing the decisions to a neutral
forum would also lessen the impact of regional passions, prejudices,
and political expediency weighing against the extraditee.
In addition, the subject matter jurisdiction of this proposed
Court would be purposefully limited. States are notoriously wary
of giving up sovereignty, even for altruistic reasons.'55 But by
restricting this Court to the adjudication of political offence
extraditions, States would merely be agreeing to an extremely
narrow loss of their sovereignty.
4. A Unified Approach to Terrorism. -Terrorism has been
defined as "the threat or use of violence in order to create extreme
fear and anxiety in a target group so as to coerce them to meet
political (or quasi-political) objectives of the perpetrators.'
156
Simply put, when violence is directed against a government or its
institutions it is revolution, when it is directed against civilians and
civilian property it is terrorism.'57 The bombing of areas frequen-
ted by the public is paradigmatic of terrorism. 8 Increasingly,
this is carried out by "well-financed and superbly organized
criminals with the resources and the tenacity to go to almost any
extreme."' 59
154. See Richard Allan, Terrorism, Extradition & International Sanctions, 3
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 327, 332 (1993). Another problem raised by the creation
of an ICC is reconciling the often conflicting principles and procedures enshrined
in domestic legal systems. See generally Karadsheh, supra note 152, passim
(comparing and contrasting the legal systems of the United States and Iran).
155. This is the reason why any proposal for an International Criminal Court
seems absurd. It would simply require states to cede too much sovereign power
to an international body.
156. SCHACHTER, supra note 115, at 162-63. Terrorism is, almost by definition,
politically motivated; however, "[t]errorism is defined by actions, not by the cause
it is intended to serve." Id. at 163.
157. Richard Allan, supra note 154, at 329.
158. See Novotne, supra note 43, passim.
159. Gianaris, supra note 138, at 105.
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While "terrorism" is often considered too nebulous a term to
use as a de jure basis for denying the application of the political
offence exception,' 6° it has a de facto application because state
practice shows that actions which endanger the lives of innocent
bystanders are often deemed not sufficiently "political., 161 For
example, States which are parties to the European Convention have
shown their willingness to abide by its terms, and routinely grant
extradition for terrorists.162 Until there is worldwide unanimity,
however, the political offence exception will be open to abuse.
5. Aut Dedere aut judicare.-The doctrine aut dedere aut
judicare mandates that a state must "either extradite or prose-
cute."' 63  This principle, which dates back to the 17th-century
philosopher Hugo Grotius,16 is set forth in numerous treaties
drafted under the auspices of the United Nations and the Council
of Europe 165 and is based upon the precept that it is in the
common interest of all states to suppress international crimes."
It is iriportant to remember that States incorporate the
political offence exception into treaties in order to avoid becoming
complicitous in the vindictive prosecution of true political offen-
ders. 67 The aut dedere principle strikes a balance between this
desire and the need to punish criminals.
160. See generally J. Dugard, Towards a Definition of International Terrorism,
67 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 94-100 (1973).
161. See generally VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 16, at 155-59.
162. See, e.g., In re, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, May 30, 1995
(applying heightened standard to an "enterprise terroriste" or an "infraction[]...
sur les explosifs"); Germany extradites suspected Islamic terrorist to France,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 25, 1995. Court rejects IRA suspect Donna
Maguire's appeal against extradition to Germany, REUTER TEXTLINE, Sept. 11,
1991.
163. See, Name, Comment, Political Offence Exceptions to United States
Extradition Policy: Aut Dedere Aut Judicare (Either Extradite or Prosecute), 1 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 109 (1991).
164. 2 H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TRES, ch. 11 § 4 (F.
Kelsey trans., publisher, 2d ed., 1925).
165. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE
415 (1986) (stating that "the contemporary trend in the world community is to
follow the maxim aut dedere aut judicare, namely to prosecute or punish.").
166. See BEDI, supra note 15, at 171-75. Indeed, failing to aid in suppressing
such criminality is tantamount to ratification of the criminal act, complicity in the
act, or even aiding and abetting the criminals. See Richard B. Lillich & John M.
Paxman, State Responsibility For Injuries To Aliens Occasioned By Terrorist
Activities, 26 AMER. U. L. REV. 217, 304 (1977).
167. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 16, at 11-13.
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Currently, the invocation of the political offence exception
results in the accused criminal receiving de facto immunity from
prosecution and has the effect of sanctioning the crimes committed
based on the criminal's motivation.1" The application of the aut
dedere principle would alleviate this problem while still respecting
the doctrinal basis for the political offence exception itself. Even
if the State from whom extradition is demanded had reason to
suspect that an unfair trial would result from extradition, it should
have no such doubts about its own courts. By subjecting these
accused criminals to local prosecution a State can prevent the abuse
of legitimate political dissidents while simultaneously ensuring that
criminals do not go unpunished.
VII. Conclusion
Theoretically, the political offence exception serves to protect
political dissidents from unjust prosecution; arguably, that is the
purest of motives. Unfortunately, in practice it is subject to abuse
by both governments and extraditees. In addition, the application
of numerous standards lead to inconsistent decisions, especially
when terrorists seek refuge under international law. Although
terrorism is universally condemned by civilized nations, the political
offence exception is still applied to terrorists.169
The foregoing suggestions are aimed at alleviating many of
these problems, if not solving them entirely. While some of the
suggestions may require slight infringements on state sovereignty,
the compromise would serve to benefit all States by suppressing
criminality and simultaneously protecting legitimate political
dissidence. At its most basic level, the raison d'etre of extradition
and the political offence exception is to balance the right to dissent
with the need to control crime. 7° Perhaps by adopting some of
these proposals the international community can restore the
balance.
168. Obviously, motivation has little bearing on prosecution under municipal
law. "Even in the context of organized political protest, persistent, organized,
premeditated lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State to
maintain order and preserve the rights of its citizens." Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 768 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(addressing restrictions on anti-abortion protests).
169. See ETA suspects row sours accord, EUR., Feb. 15-21, 1996, at A2.
170. See Abramovsky, supra note 23, at n.87.

